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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/541,206	07/05/2005	Jurgen Schmidt-Thummes	273621US0PCT	7671
22850	7590	12/17/2008		
OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND MAIER & NEUSTADT, P.C. 1940 DUKE STREET ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314				
EXAMINER				
BERNSHTEYN, MICHAEL				
ART UNIT		PAPER NUMBER		
1796				
NOTIFICATION DATE		DELIVERY MODE		
12/17/2008		ELECTRONIC		

**Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.**

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es):

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**Advisory Action**  
**Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief**

**Application No.**

10/541,206

**Applicant(s)**

SCHMIDT-THUMMES ET AL.

**Examiner**

MICHAEL M. BERNSHTEYN

**Art Unit**

1796

**--The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --**

THE REPLY FILED 03 December 2008 FAILS TO PLACE THIS APPLICATION IN CONDITION FOR ALLOWANCE.

1. ☐ The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on the same day as filing a Notice of Appeal. To avoid abandonment of this application, applicant must timely file one of the following replies: (1) an amendment, affidavit, or other evidence, which places the application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in compliance with 37 CFR 41.31; or (3) a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 CFR 1.114. The reply must be filed within one of the following time periods:

- a) ☒ The period for reply expires 3 months from the mailing date of the final rejection.  
b) ☐ The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Advisory Action, or (2) the date set forth in the final rejection, whichever is later. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of the final rejection.  
Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE FIRST REPLY WAS FILED WITHIN TWO MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(f).

Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date on which the petition under 37 CFR 1.136(a) and the appropriate extension fee have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension and the corresponding amount of the fee. The appropriate extension fee under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened statutory period for reply originally set in the final Office action; or (2) as set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of the final rejection, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

**NOTICE OF APPEAL**

2. ☐ The Notice of Appeal was filed on \_\_\_\_\_. A brief in compliance with 37 CFR 41.37 must be filed within two months of the date of filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any extension thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to avoid dismissal of the appeal. Since a Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed within the time period set forth in 37 CFR 41.37(a).

**AMENDMENTS**

3. ☐ The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, but prior to the date of filing a brief, will not be entered because  
(a) ☐ They raise new issues that would require further consideration and/or search (see NOTE below);  
(b) ☐ They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE below);  
(c) ☐ They are not deemed to place the application in better form for appeal by materially reducing or simplifying the issues for appeal; and/or  
(d) ☐ They present additional claims without canceling a corresponding number of finally rejected claims.

NOTE: \_\_\_\_\_. (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).

4. ☐ The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.121. See attached Notice of Non-Compliant Amendment (PTOL-324).  
5. ☐ Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s): \_\_\_\_\_.  
6. ☐ Newly proposed or amended claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ would be allowable if submitted in a separate, timely filed amendment canceling the non-allowable claim(s).  
7. ☒ For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) ☐ will not be entered, or b) ☒ will be entered and an explanation of how the new or amended claims would be rejected is provided below or appended.  
The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:  
Claim(s) allowed: \_\_\_\_\_.  
Claim(s) objected to: \_\_\_\_\_.  
Claim(s) rejected: 1-12.  
Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: \_\_\_\_\_.

**AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE**

8. ☐ The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but before or on the date of filing a Notice of Appeal will not be entered because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and sufficient reasons why the affidavit or other evidence is necessary and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).  
9. ☐ The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing a Notice of Appeal, but prior to the date of filing a brief, will not be entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to overcome all rejections under appeal and/or appellant fails to provide a showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 41.33(d)(1).  
10. ☐ The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation of the status of the claims after entry is below or attached.

**REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER**

11. ☒ The request for reconsideration has been considered but does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:  
See Continuation Sheet.  
12. ☐ Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s). (PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s). \_\_\_\_\_.  
13. ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_.

/Randy Gulakowski/  
Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 1796

/Michael M. Bernshteyn/  
Examiner, Art Unit 1796

Continuation of 11. NOTE: In response to Applicants arguments that nothing in any of the art relied on by the Office discloses or suggests that carrying out a polymerization according to the conditions recited in the present claims would provide a process that forms a lower amount of coagulum (page 2, 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph), and that the September 3, 2008 Office Action does not appear to give any consideration to Applicants' rebuttal evidence, and Applicants submit that the Office's failure to consider this evidence in support of patentability is legal error (page 3, 1<sup>st</sup> paragraph), it is noted the following.

As it was mentioned by Applicants in response filed May 30, 2008 "When the product of the inventive and comparative examples is isolated, the coagulum formed in the inventive example is at least 35% less than the amount of coagulum formed in Comparative Example 1 (compare 105 ppm versus 165 ppm, respectively). Reducing the amount of coagulum permits faster filtration and more efficient manufacture of the desired polymer" (page 11, 4<sup>th</sup> paragraph). It means that the only inventive example of the specification shows the presence of 105 ppm coagulum. It is noted that almost all examples of Ostrowski's reference do not contain any coagulum, see col. 9-13 of the tables, which are free of reaction vessel deposits (see the row titled "deposit in vessel" of each of the tables in col. 9-13). Therefore, it is not clear which positive effect and unexpected result could be obtained by using the Applicants invention wherein the partial neutralization of the monomers c) takes place before the polymerization?

It is worth to mention that according MPEP 716.01(c): "Objective evidence which must be factually supported by an appropriate affidavit or declaration to be of probative value includes evidence of unexpected results, commercial success, solution of a long-felt need, inoperability of the prior art, invention before the date of the reference, and allegations that the author(s) of the prior art derived the disclosed subject matter from the applicant. See, for example, *In re De Blauwe*, 736 F.2d 699, 705, 222 USPQ 191, 196 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("It is well settled that unexpected results must be established by factual evidence." "[A]ppellants have not presented any experimental data showing that prior heat-shrinkable articles split. Due to the absence of tests comparing appellant's heat shrinkable articles with those of the closest prior art, we conclude that appellant's assertions of unexpected results constitute mere argument."). See also *In re Lindner*, 457 F.2d 506, 508, 173 USPQ 356, 358 (CCPA 1972); *Ex parte George*, 21 USPQ2d 1058 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1991). In our case, unexpected results must be established between Ostrowski's process for preparing a stable aqueous copolymer dispersion (it is the closest prior art) and the claimed process, wherein the partial neutralization of the monomers c) takes place before the polymerization. In response to Applicants argument that those of ordinary skill in the art would not turn to Basu as inspiration to modify the Ostrowski process because the process of Ostrowski doesn't suffer from the reaction vessel deposit problem allegedly solved by Basu (page 4, 1<sup>st</sup> paragraph), and that The processes described in the Egraz and Kimura references are likewise substantially different from the process of the present claims for the reason, inter alia, that they describe processes carried out on monomer mixtures that are different from the monomer mixture recited in the present claims (page 4, 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph), it is noted that one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See *In re Keller*, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); *In re Merck & Co.*, 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

It is further noted that "The motivation in the prior art to combine references does not have to be identical to that of the applicant to establish obviousness, i.e. it is not required for a finding of obviousness that motivation of the skilled artisan be the same as an applicant motivation", *In re Kamps*, 97 F.3d 1427, 1430, 40 USPQ2d 1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding there is sufficient motivation to combine teachings of prior art to achieve claimed invention where one reference specifically refers to the other). Therefore, it is well settled that for a finding of obviousness under § 103 the prior art need not disclose the same motivation as disclosed by an applicant. Thus the rejection under 35 USC 103(a) cannot be withdrawn and remains in force.